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Cover Sheet

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Muslim Rage, Western Fear, and the Clash of Civilizations

Stereotypic Constructions in the World Press's Coverage of the Danish Cartoon Controversy of 2006:

(7, 248 words, including references)

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Abstract (150 words)

This study analyzed 56 news stories from English language media in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Mideast covering the Danish Cartoon Controversy of 2006. The details of the controversy are first described to demonstrate how a "western" and a "Muslim" side of the story were available to journalists. The western side of the story focused on the "Clash of Civilizations" and the sharp emotional divide between Muslim rage and western fear of that rage. The Muslim side of the story deepened the motivations of the Muslim protestors apart from anger. To test which interpretation best describes the journalistic coverage, I analyzed the news stories for the degree of anger or fear they used as well as who (Muslim/Non-Muslim) was expressing it. The results showed a statistically significant trend for "Clash of Civilizations" coverage. These results are interpreted as a stereotypical coverage and we discuss requirements for moving beyond it.

1. The Danish Cartoon Controversy

By all accounts, including his own, two weeks in September 2005 proved a fateful learning experience for Flemming Rose, the cultural editor of the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, the largest in Denmark. In a February 19, 2006 article written for the *Washington Post* called "Why I published those cartoons," Rose allows that in these two weeks he came to learn about the frequency with which Europeans were willing to "self-censor" their behavior to accommodate Muslim sensitivities. He recalls learning, for example, from an interview with a Danish standup comedian that the comedian boasted he wouldn't think twice about "urinating on the Bible in front of a camera" but confessed he wouldn't dare repeat the stunt on the Koran. He learned about a Danish author, Kara Bluitgen, writing a children's book about Islam, and complaining that, in light of Islam's strict prohibitions against depicting images of Muhammad (a sign of idolatry), he couldn't find an illustrator willing to risk doing the artwork for his book. Three illustrators had already turned down the job, fearing "consequences." And the illustrator who finally took the job accepted it only under the guarantee of anonymity. He learned that European translators of a book critical to Islam required the same guarantee, and he learned that the book's author had already gone into hiding. He learned that the Tate gallery of London had taken down a controversial exhibit that depicted the Koran, Bible and Talmud torn to shreds. The gallery defended its action in coded terms, saying that it did not want to rile any feelings so soon

after the London bombings. He learned further that the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen had been recently lobbied by a group of Imams to write more positive stories about Islam.

Rose took these various learning episodes as an awakening and call to action. In his own words, (Rose, 2006) he "wrote to members of the association of Danish cartoonists asking them 'to draw Muhammad as you see him.'" He hadn't intended by this request "to trigger violent demonstrations throughout the Muslim world" but simply to "push back self-imposed limits on expression that seemed to be closing in tighter" (Rose, 2006). He was solely interested in testing and strengthening the principle of free speech in a secular liberal society like Denmark.

He was probably not thinking of the different historical lenses through which westerners and Muslims perceive religious art and satire. Trained in a modernist tradition of satire to see pictures formally, playfully and at a safe distance from what they represent, western viewers know, in concept at least, the difference between a satirical view of a sacred image and its desecration. As Kimmelman (2006) observed, "The Muslim world has no tradition of, or tolerance for, religious irony in its art." Nonetheless, even for westerners, as for Muslims, religious iconology can carry what Kimmelman called a "totemic" power, standing in for the thing itself, without intellectual mediation.

On September 30, the *Jyllands-Posten* published all twelve submissions. Some of the images of Muhammad were reverent; others were not. Of the latter, one infamously depicted Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. Contrary to much media reporting, when the cartoons were eventually submitted, many Muslims in Denmark supported Rose's stance protecting free speech. BBC interviews found that Danish Muslims were divided about the desirability

or even the need to wage a protest (Buch-Anderson, 2006). However, a great many Danish Muslims, perhaps the majority, including much of the religious leadership, took the newspaper's free speech defense as disingenuous. Rose's motives were thought to be darker, intended to slight the status of Muslims as immigrant minorities more than to inspire free expression in Denmark's artistic community. When the story broke beyond Danish borders, the larger Muslim community was also divided, but also mainly skeptical about free speech being the salient issue. Siraj Wahab (2006), covering the story for the *Arab News* of Jeddah, interviewed Mohamed Ramady, whose words appeared typical of much Arab/Muslim opinion across a spectrum of news stories: "The issue was not one of freedom of the press but legal protection of religion under European blasphemy laws."

Muslims worldwide, but particularly in Denmark, had some reason for their skepticism about free speech being the operative issue behind the publishing of the cartoons. Since 9/11 and the November 2001 election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the political climate of Denmark had become increasingly unwelcoming to its immigrant population of Muslims. Once in power, Rasmussen worked with the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party to pass some of Europe's harshest anti-immigrant and anti-terrorism laws. The Party had declared Islam not a religion but a terrorist organization. The leader of the party, Pia Kjaersgaard, advocated deporting any Imam who was not a Danish citizen. Enough Danes were in agreement with these views that as the cartoon controversy escalated, the approval ratings of the People's Party increased from 12.1% to 14.5 % (Iverson, 2006). From a country of 5.4 million residents with no Muslims only a few decades back, the Muslim immigrant population in Denmark had swelled to 200,000 by 2006 (Sullivan, 2006). Many Danes did not welcome this ever-growing and visible Muslim

minority. Writing on Denmark's "xenophobia" for *The New York Times*, Martin Burcharth (February 12, 2006) reported that Muslim artists were rarely welcomed into the Danish artistic community and often actively excluded. The People's Party had established a canon of Danish art openly excluding the works of what the Party described as a "parallel society in which minorities practice their own medieval values and undemocratic views."

Although accounts vary, the Muslim Danish community tried to contain the controversy by seeking redress from Danish authorities. Danish Imam Raed Hlayhel sought an immediate apology from the newspaper. The paper refused, defending its right of free speech (Assyrian International News, March 15, 2006). On October 12, Muslim leaders across Denmark, led by Ahmed Abu Laban, of the Islamic Cultural Center in Copenhagen, along with several of his colleagues and ambassadors from ten Muslim countries and Palestine, requested an audience with Rasmussen himself (Sullivan, February 12, 2006). On October 21, Rasmussen officially declined their request, saying "I will never accept that respect for a religious stance leads to the curtailment of criticism, humour and satire in the press." Several political observers at the time saw the prime minister's words as intended to raise his support among his largely anti-Muslim voter base (Iverson, March 2, 2006). On October 28, several Danish Muslim groups submitted a criminal complaint against the newspaper, which the prosecutor refused to carry forward (Fox News, February 6, 2006). Muslims in Denmark marched by the thousands to protest the cartoons. By early November, it had become apparent that there would be no internal resolution of the flare-up within Denmark. Both sides recognized they would need to work outside Denmark to rally support. The national controversy would explode into a global one.

In early December, Laban and his colleagues sought support across the Muslim world. For the rest of December and January, they along with envoys toured major cities across the Muslim world equipped with the offending cartoons and a 43-page document decrying the "racism and Islamophobia" that Muslims in Denmark were forced to bear (Rennie, February 8, 2006). The *Jyllands-Posten*, also in search of allies, sought support across the major media organizations of the west. On January 10**,** a Christian newspaper based in Norway, *Magazinet*, reprinted the cartoons (Fox News, February 6, 2006). For the remainder of January and into early February, newspapers across Europe, Asia, and even parts of the Middle East followed suit (Fox News, February 6, 2006). The reproduction of Muhammad images across the globe offended Muslims anew and offended many even more than the original publication. "'It's not the publication in Denmark I find most objectionable," opined a schoolteacher who was interviewed. "It's the re-publication in France after all the riots that happened there. This is their way of telling the Muslims: 'You are second-class citizens. We don't care about your sensitivities'" (Shamsie, February 15, 2006).

By early February, the Danish cartoon controversy had become the lead headline of 24/7 cable news on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, the two powerhouse Arabic-language television news networks (Sullivan, February 12, 2006). Violence erupted across the Muslim world against Denmark and its symbols. The news days between February 2nd and February 9th in particular saw hourly updates of the events triggered by the cartoons. Throughout the Muslim world, there were protests, arrests, calls for boycotts, calls for tolerance, the desecration of property, and, according to a website keeping body counts, http://www.cartoonbodycount.com/, the loss of 139 lives by March 2, 2006, about the time the controversy had run its course as a headline-grabber.

2. Competing Narratives of Muslim-Western Relations

The Danish Cartoon Controversy furnishes an interesting case study for investigating the discourse depicting relations between the Muslim world and the west. In the first week of February, 2006, the tensions in this relationship dominated the world press. What were the possibilities for representing the conflict and how did these possibilities compare to the actual coverage? To seek answers to these questions, it is useful to review the leading scholarship on representations of Muslim-western relations.

One of the dominant frameworks for understanding Muslim-west relations grows out of the work of Princeton emeritus historian, Bernard Lewis. Lewis' thinking has influenced the thinking of the American presidency and especially the foreign policies of both Bush administrations. While Lewis is a leading and respected scholar of the Mideast and should never be confused whole cloth with the Bush administration's Middle East policy, the Bush policy of bringing western-style democracy to Islamic states is a legacy of the Bush administration's interpretation of Bernard Lewis's ideas.

Some of Lewis' theories, crystallized across many books, were popularized in a 1990 *Atlantic Monthly* article entitled *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (Lewis, 1990), and later in his 2002 book *What went wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Lewis, 2002). Lewis's title *What went wrong?* does not refer to what went wrong to cause 9/11. It refers to what went wrong to cause Islam's decline *over its history*, and more particularly, what went wrong with Islam's historical relationship to the west. Lewis's answer is detailed and multi-faceted but a brief summary suffices here: At the peak of its worldwide power and influence, prior to the western enlightenment, the Muslim world

rightly saw itself at the scientific and cultural center of the world, surrounded by unbelieving barbarians. To the east were polytheists who were mostly weak and divided. To the north and west was the rival monotheistic system of Christendom. Lewis views the historical rivalry between Islamdom and Christendom as a "Clash of Civilizations," a phrase Lewis is credited as coining (Hirsch, 2004; see also Huntington, 1996). For the first millennia of their rivalry, according to Lewis, Islam had the upper hand. For the past three hundred years, since the rise of the European colonialism in Asia and Africa, Islam has been on the retreat. Lewis describes the Muslim decline as the suffering of one psychological defeat after another, as Muslims tried variously and failed variously to emulate western political assemblies, factories, and other organizational structures and strategies (Lewis, September 1990). Failure led to anger and blame, as Lewis explains:

> When you become aware that something is going wrong and you say "What went wrong?", there are two ways you can follow up. One is what I have just described: in effect, to say "What did we do wrong?", and that leads to "How do we put it right?" The other response when you are aware that things are going wrong is "Who did this to us?" And that leads into a twilight world of neurotic fantasies and conspiracy theories. This has also been a line much followed by some people, though by no means all, in the Islamic world (Carnegie Council 2002 interview with Lewis on "What went wrong?").

The latter response, so far as it has been amplified by influential and media-savvy voices in the Muslim world, precipitates a culture of rage, a deep-seated disposition that "turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every problem insoluble" (Lewis,

September 1990). *What Went Wrong* chronicles what in Lewis' view is, in its decline, the chronic Muslim disinterest to learn from the west, adjust to it, or integrate with it. To illustrate that disinterest in integration, Lewis cites the fifteenth century Moroccan jurist al-Wansharīsī who, reminiscent of the controversy in Denmark, pondered whether a Muslim could live a pious life as a minority in a Christian land practicing religious tolerance. al-Wansharīsī's response was an emphatic no. If such a government practiced true tolerance, Wansharīsī reasoned, "the danger of apostasy [would only be] greater" (Lewis 2002: p. 39). To illustrate that disinterest in curiosity and learning from other religions, Lewis notes that, as inheritors of the Old and New Testament, Muslims felt they could dismiss anything in those previous monotheisms that hadn't survived into their own (Lewis 2002: p. 36). In light of their reluctance toward intercultural curiosity, adaptation, or integration, Muslims found it difficult, according to Lewis, to reconcile two incompatible views: their faith in the inherent superiority of Islam and the Muslim reality of living in a subaltern relationship to cultures of non-believers (Lewis, September 1990). The incompatibility of these views produces instability and resentment, and leaves Muslims unappeased. According to Lewis, this resentment underlies the chronic instability of regimes in Ethiopian Eritrea, Indian Kashmir, Chinese Sinkiang, and Yugoslav Kossovo, all instances of large Muslim populations governed by non-Muslims (Lewis, September 1990).

Lewis's views of the relationship between Islam and west have come under increasing criticism by a new generation of Mideast specialists, notably Columbia historian Richard Bulliet, whose 2004 book, *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*, is a direct rebuttal to *What went Wrong?* For Bulliet, "*What went wrong?*" assumes a western bias

favoring a particular endpoint of history. Yet this endpoint, Bulliet argues, is itself ahistorical, because:

> no one in Europe and North America knew where the ship they were sailing on was heading. The great goals that the west now believes it has achieved—equality of race and gender, peace, and unity among European nations, global dominance…and the unquestioned dominance of democratic government—were invisible to Europeans and Americans alike throughout the whole of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth (Bulliet, 2004: p.49).

Bulliet goes on to argue that Lewis's master narrative of the west and Islam caught in the throes of a death struggle for supremacy is ill-founded and unfortunate. As Bulliet sees it, Muslim rage did not arise from Islam's centuries old "clash of cultures" with Christendom, but is a manifestation of early nineteenth century colonial policies, the twentieth-century colonial division of Arabic-speaking countries by Britain and France after World War I, the corrupt tyrannies in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, the chronic poverty, unemployment, the growing rift between rich and poor in the Muslim world, and, most recently, the debacle of American mid-eastern policy. Bulliet argues that over the course of their history, Islam and the west have been more culturally integrated than commonly understood. Islam has also been more heterogeneous and divided within itself than was popularly understood before the recent civil war in Iraq.

The current challenge for Muslim states, as Bulliet sees it, is to strengthen Islamic institutions that now lie at the periphery, institutions that promote tolerance

and that have potential to support democratic liberalism and social justice. Such strengthening of Islam's institutions "on the edge" (Bulliet, 1994) can only happen, in Bulliet's view, by educating the west and Muslims alike on the crisis of authority that now challenges the future of Islam. The course of this crisis was set at the beginning of the nineteenth century. At that time, Islamic powers such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire sought to emulate the secular bureaucracies they saw western powers adopting to extend their colonial might. As Bulliet (2002-2003: p. 35) notes, while secular organization in the west had come to mean an increasing separation of Church and state, for Muslim rulers in the nineteenth and twentieth century, including Post-Ottoman rulers like Atatürk in Turkey and Hafez al-Assad in Syria, the new secularism meant the suppression of Islam by the state. European and American foreign policy contributed further to the problem by helping to prop up military strongmen and secular monarchs as rulers in the name of a "modernism" that decreased rather than increased religious tolerance and worsened rather than bettered the lives of ordinary citizens (Bulliet, February 2004).

The cumulative effect of these misadventures has been to push the stabilizing influences of Islamic education, law, and scholarship from the center to the periphery of Muslim civil society. This marginalization has left a vacuum that prevents citizens in most Muslim states from talking back to their repressive governments. The vacuum has been filled by a more aberrant strain of fundamentalism led by Sayyid Qutb and later, Osama bin Laden.

If the Lewis doctrine views bin Laden as an archetypal example of Muslim rage, Bulliet argues that bin Ladenism only echoes the dubious "clash of

civilizations" thesis from the Muslim side. Bin Laden and his ilk are not the products of Islam, but the perversions left from Islam's misshaping at the hands of colonization, secularization, and marginalization. Taking a historical lens on Islam, Bulliet argues that in every era where Islam has faced a crisis of authority similar to the one it faces now, it emerged from the crisis whole because of a decentralized adaptiveness and tolerance that, in Bulliet's view, has been at the heart of Islam historically. He writes that: "discord was often resolved when Muslim leaders agreed to respect divergent views while recognizing a common interest in the welfare of the global Muslim community" (2002-2003: p. 40). Bulliet's scholarship has shown that such decentralized tolerance has been a longstanding staple of Islam's successful past and Bulliet remains guardedly optimistic that it will prevail once again in Islam's future. "The hearts of most ordinary Muslims", opines Bulliet, join the west in awaiting strong Islamic leaders who can voice a "vision of a peaceful fraternal world" (2002-2003: p. 40). Bulliet sees much "diversity and effervescence" (Bulliet, 2003: p. 15) at the edges of Islam even today, voices with the potential to move closer to the center, voices of Islam he regards as grounds for hope:

> When you talk to the Imam Khatib of the mosque, he says, "Well, this is for the neighborhood. People in the neighborhood are giving the money. We want to rebuild Islam here." He does not say that he also wants to destroy the United States. And that to me is the hope of all this—people constructing in their own communities lives of religious worth and

aspiration without regard to foreign policy objectives or conflicts (Bulliet, 2003: p. 17).

Under the Lewis doctrine of west-Islam relations, the boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims are cast in emotional categories. Islam is steeped in rage, emotions rooted in the past. One can't sustain rage without agreeing to make one's future the constant reliving of an aggrieved past. A person enraged has no mind to listen. Persons, or civilizations, confronted with rage, moreover, face similarly limited options of response. They can ignore the rage, return it, fear it, or wait for it to subside. But rage cannot be rationally addressed, for it itself is irrational, unmoved by reason-giving.

Under Bulliet's alternative, Muslim rage is a modern offshoot of colonial history and secular structures suppressing Islam, not Islam per se. Bulliet suggests that when Islam has been in crisis in the past, it has solved the problem by summoning all parties to look beyond the past to the future. The future is uncertain and contingent but it is there. When through that uncertainty and contingency negative outcomes are forecast, the future is laden with fear. When positive outcomes are forecast, it is laden with hope. When Islam and the west each have open futures, they have the possibility, in Bulliet's narrative, of fearing together, hoping together, or both. In both sharing a future, they may have opportunities to share some of it together, as common ground.

3. Exploring the World Coverage of the Danish Cartoon Controversy for its Narratives of Islam-West Relations

What narrative frames of Islam-west relations does mainstream journalism around the world rely on? The Danish cartoon controversy provides one global data source to explore this question empirically. In section 1, the Danish Cartoon controversy was described in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the world press had ample opportunity to describe Islam-western relations under terms of either the Lewis or Bulliet narratives. In light of the physical manifestations of Muslim rage that took place during the controversy, the availability of the Lewis narrative for reporting the controversy is easy to understand. Yet the grounds for a Bulliet-like framing are also available in the specifics of the controversy. The Danish Muslims were arguably subjected to a chilly political climate that left them with genuine vulnerabilities. According to many accounts, they had made good faith efforts to resolve the conflict with Danish authorities before the conflict escalated into an international story. Sacred principles of their religion had been violated and they were thrown the bone of free speech as justification for their having to endure repeated violations of their faith in one country after another. Given the Muslim framing of the story, there was as much grist for stories about the complexity of Muslim motivation for protesting--their fears, frustrations, feelings of betrayal, disappointments and dashed hopes--as there was grist to feature stories about their rage. What choices did journalists covering the story in fact make? The remainder of this paper reports a corpus study of news reporting of the controversy focused precisely to answer this question.

Procedures

To compile a corpus of news stories about the Danish Cartoon Controversy, we turned to Google News Archives™. We defined a news story as containing in the stream of discourse a verbal word or phrase that synopsized the main event or action of the story. Examples are *has become global crisis, issues warning, apologizes, tells, rejected, schedules talks, becomes leads thousands, attacked, to meet with*, and so on. This surface constraint made sure that straight news—or what purported to be straight news-- was being extracted rather than editorial opinion or commentary. We wanted to focus on straight news reporting because, unlike opinion or commentary, events of a story can be told without revealing the emotional motivations of the actors. One can report "Demonstrators burned the Danish flag" without reporting "Enraged demonstrators burned the Danish flag." The latter statement contains a discretionary revelation of emotion that is revealing precisely because it is a discretionary choice.

We further imposed the constraint of wanting to draw news stories from North America, Europe, Asia, and the Muslim world. we had thought of selecting stories from multiple languages as well, but decided against it to keep the sample size manageable for analysis. We determined on a minimum sample size of 30 news articles for statistical robustness.

Because of the short chronological spacing of the story, the high repetition across stories, and the fact that many media outlets relied on the same wire services to carry identical stories, we found it necessary to include the uniqueness and diversity of the stories as a third criterion of selection. We aimed for a ceiling in the range of 50 articles, which, in light of this uniqueness and diversity criterion, required a great deal of sifting of news stories beyond that ceiling.

With these three selection criteria, We searched Google News Archive[1] under "Danish Cartoon Controversy" and 315 articles were retrieved. We had to comb through 181 articles returned from this retrieval before settling on 56 news stories that met all three selection criteria. A listing of the news stories is presented in Figure 1. The news stories appeared mainly in the first week of February, when the story was at its peak. Fifty-three of the fifty-six stores appeared between February 1 and February 24. The distribution of news stories within these dates is presented in Figure 2.

We next developed lexically-based coding schemes for anger/rage and fear. That is, we focused on words signaling anger and words signaling fear. We did not gather these words from the current data set, but from previous data sets where we have studied these emotions in discourse. Figure 3 provides representative examples of word indicative of both emotion types. The complete coding system relied on 451 words signaling anger and 253 words signaling fear.

We next applied these emotion-based codes to the 56 articles in question using special coding software my research group had developed. To see how the articles clustered by emotion, We ran a cluster analysis on the 56 articles. We found a 3 cluster solution that intuitively divided the 56 articles into three categories: (1) News stories that that convey a high anger to fear ratio, that is, stories where the reporting of anger dominates the reporting of fear; (2) news stories that convey a higher fear to anger ratio, or stories where the ratio of fear is anger is highest; (3) news stories with relatively even or low amounts of fear and anger.

In Figures 4, 5, and 6, we present the articles that fell into each cluster, along with their frequencies on anger and fear. To illustrate the differences between these clusters, let's

consider just the top-ranking stories of clusters 1 and 2. A *San Diego Union Tribune* story of February 8, 2006 had an anger frequency of 1.6% and a fear frequency of 0% (Figure 4). This means that, in this article, for every 100 words, 1or 2 of these words, on average, express anger. But no word, on average, expresses fear. What does such a high anger/low fear story read like? Consider below a short passage from the *Union Tribune* story.

Headline: Rage over cartoons of prophet unabated

KABUL, Afghanistan –Tens of thousands of Muslims demonstrated in parts of the Middle East, Africa and Asia, continuing to vent their rage over European newspaper cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad. Some Muslim clerics and governments called for calm, while others seemed to encourage the vengeful outpouring….Rasmussen, speaking directly to the public for the first time since attackers began torching Danish diplomatic missions, blamed the violence on "radicals, extremists and fanatics."

Words triggering anger are *vent, rage, mocking, vengeful, torching, and blamed*. There are no fear words. What does a "fear" story read like? As we can see from Figure 5, one of TV New Zealand's news stories of February 8 contains the highest frequency of fear words (.85) and no anger words.

Headline: Exporters fear cartoon backlash

Some New Zealand exporters are worried that the publication of the controversial cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed here will cost them dearly. Export New Zealand chief executive Bob Walters says a number of companies have expressed concern at the potential impact on business from publication of the cartoons. Walters says companies are also concerned for the safety of their staff abroad. If they do, Trade and Enterprise will tell them to stay in contact with their agents or distributors in the markets where they have concerns.

Words triggering fear are *fear, worried, concern, concerned, concerns*. Note that the grain of coding so far discussed indicates how anger and fear are distributed throughout the 56 articles. However, it does not as yet tell us *who* is angry and *who* is fearful. To answer these questions, we needed to move from automatic to human coding. We developed a four-part coding scheme for the source of anger as either:

1) Muslims expressing anger against violence (e.g. Muslims denounce violence);

2) An unattributed expression of anger (e.g. there was anger in the air);

3) Non-Muslims expressing anger (e.g., the Danish government was angry);

4) Muslims expressing anger (e.g., Muslims were enraged over).

We used the same four-part division to code the source of fear as either:

1) Muslims expressing fear about violence (e.g. Muslims feared the violence);

2) An unattributed expression of fear (e.g. there was fear in the air);

3) Non-Muslims expressing fear (e.g., the Danish government was fearful);

4) Muslim expressing fear (e.g., Muslims were fearful over).

There were 228 occurrences of anger and fear across the 56 news stories that had been tagged by automatic coding. We independently hand coded 25 instances of each emotion (50 overall or 22% of all the coding instances) and a research assistant coded the same 50, with an inter-rater agreement of 85%. We then coded based on a simpler two category split – whether the emotion was being attributed to a Muslim or non-Muslim. We were able to get 98% agreement. We employed for the remainder of the analysis the simpler two category coding (Muslim/Non-Muslim) as the source of the two categories of emotion (anger/fear).

My hypotheses were straightforward. If journalists were operating under the Lewis narrative of Islam-west relations, the ideological divide between Muslims and non-Muslims would also be a simple emotional divide between anger and fear. Within the Clash of Civilizations narrative, Muslims are possessed by an (irrational) anger/rage at the heart of their psychological disposition, with non-Muslims functioning as agents of rationality left somehow to deal with the rage, including fearing it. More operationally, we would expect to see Muslims disproportionately placed in the subject role of persons experiencing anger. Non-Muslims would be disproportionately placed in the subject role of persons experiencing fear. By contrast, if the Bulliet narrative were operative, alternative mappings of emotion and role identities would be in evidence. Anger or fear, or both, or neither, would be more evenly distributed across the subject positions of Muslims and non-Muslims.

Results

The results of the coding are shown in Figures 7 and 8. As these figures show, the Lewis narrative of "clashing civilization" Islam-west relations was strongly confirmed. As Figure 7 makes clear, when journalists brought anger into their stories about the cartoon controversy, it was disproportionately Muslim anger. The difference in proportions of anger assigned to Muslims vs. non-Muslims is statistically significant, χ^2 (2, N = 158) = 12.32, $p < 0.01$. As Figure 8 makes clear, when journalists brought fear into their stories, non-Muslims were disproportionately those in the subject role of fear, and typically fearful of Muslim rage. Because of the lower number of occurrences of fear relative to anger throughout the corpus, this finding did not quite reach statistical significance, though it remained a clear

quantitative trend. At the same time, the Clash of Civilization thesis depends on Muslim rage It does not require any determinate response from the west, though (rational) fear is a common option.

On balance, then, the Lewis narrative was found to explain a large majority of news sources in the corpus. Nonetheless, the Lewis narrative does not explain all. There were atypical stories in the corpus that covered Muslims as rounded characters, with a machinery of emotions more complex than rage. The February 18th edition of *The New York Times,* for example, featured a story that dug deeper into the psyches of Muslim protesters, looking beyond their anger into their fears about being accepted in Europe. Here's an excerpt:

> Many protesters said the cartoons, first published in a newspaper in Denmark, had stirred up an old fear, that Muslims in the West remain strangers to their neighbors, even generations after arriving here. But a number of attendees said they mainly viewed the cartoons as an indicator of the tensions facing the surging Muslim population in Europe.

A February 9th story in the *Arab News* opens not with the rage of Muslims, but with their disappointment:

> JEDDAH, 9 February 2006 — Muslims are expressing further disappointment with the Danish newspaper that published sacrilegious cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) after The Guardian of London reported that the same publication had earlier

> refused to run cartoons of the Prophet Jesus (peace be upon him) contending they could be offensive to readers.

The story also portrays Muslims endowed with a complex and socially empathic mental life. Muslims are shown to harbor doubts about making accusations without good evidence. They are shown to extend the benefit of the doubt to others and form harsh judgments only when there is solid and available evidence.

> "We have always had our doubts that the cartoons were published with a view to insulting Muslims. But ever since this controversy burst onto the Muslim street, there was this other view in the Muslim world, which said that maybe the Jyllands-Posten editors did not foresee the consequences of their decision and that they genuinely believed in the freedom of expression. But this report flies smack into the face of the newspaper's editors," wrote Nasser Al-Haddad on an Arab website.

The *Arab News* story also shows Muslims as worthy and reliable negotiating partners, interested in finding common ground with the west.

> We have many differences with Europe and Europeans, but Prophets should be above lampooning because in the end we are all People of the Book. If Prophet Jesus or Prophet Moses were lampooned, the reaction in the Muslim world would have been on similar lines," she told Arab News.

Finally, Muslims are portrayed as discriminating arguers, who do not stereotype their opponents and who keep blame limited and focused to the point at hand.

> An imam in Jeddah said: "Danes are good people. They should not be harmed. Like all societies they do have their fair share of extremists. The newspaper is clearly to blame here for heaping this insult on Muslims. People are very frustrated at what is happening now."

Unfortunately, such balanced journalism about Muslims as human beings with a mental life more complex than rage turned out regrettably rare in our corpus.

4. Discussion

In many respects, the results of this study are not surprising because the stereotype of Muslim rage powerfully intersects both western intellectual and popular culture. And, despite some *Arab News* outlets humanizing Muslims, we found no systematic differences in reporting of the controversy, relative to the distribution of anger and fear, from one region of the world to another. (The results are likely to have been vastly different had we retrieved stories from other languages, especially Arabic.) The question then to explore is what makes the Muslim-western "Clash of Civilizations" and its sharp emotional divide between anger and fear such a potent stereotype for English language journalists? Or better yet, what makes compelling *alternatives* to the stereotype so difficult to come by?

From the very inception of the controversy, Flemming Rose defined the conflict along the sharp lines of liberal free speech vs. an illiberal requirement for self-censorship. He

insisted that he was willing to respect the faith of Muslims, but not to submit to their faith. Stanley Fish, an opponent of absolutist free speech (Fish, 1994) nonetheless wrote an Op Ed (Fish, 2006) for the *New York Times* reaffirming Rose's analysis. He saw the west and Islam belonging to different and irreconcilable "religions." The west prays at the altar of liberalism. The Muslim world does not.

The Clash of Civilizations interpretation in west-Muslim relations seems unavoidable when liberalism, as a value, is required to live on one side of the divide but not the other. The question those seeking substantive alternatives have sought to ask is whether there can be an Islamic liberalism? Fawaz Gerges (2005) has argued affirmatively to this question. He sees a liberalism that is emergent in the Muslim world, though still below the radar of major media visibility. Websites (Kurzman, 2007 provides multiple pages of links) seeking to advocate, and in a few cases, elaborate, a liberal Islam, promoting "human rights, legal transparency and the peaceful transfer of power" are springing up as never before among generations of young Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the most powerful multi-national organization in the Arab world, has paid homage to liberal democracy as "the most effective mechanism to guard against political authoritarianism and protect the human rights of the Muslim Ummah" (i.e., community) (Gerges, 2005).

These emergent movements to implant liberalism in the Muslim world distance themselves from American foreign policy efforts to "westernize" Muslims. These movements dissociate liberalism from the west, seeking to construct an Islamic version of liberal democracy that respects tolerance and rights without displacing the central role of Islamic institutions in civil society. Bulliet (February, 2004) has asked whether the west might not offer assistance to these emergent movements in the Mideast. The conceptual

terrain here is tricky, he notes, because we have few solid precedents for wedding the religious disinterest of western liberalism to the religious interest required of an Islamic liberal state. Furthermore, if such an Islamic liberalism is formulated, Bulliet notes, it must apply not only to Muslim states, but to Muslim minorities living in London or Copenhagen as well. If the Danish Cartoon Controversy showed anything, it showed that an Islamic liberalism can never work if it can't co-articulate with western-style liberalism. Though these liberalisms must be different, they must still be formulated to "play well together" in hard cases, like the Danish Cartoon Case. This is likely to require rethinking and retrofitting western liberalism to the Islamic context rather than trying to innovate an entirely new understanding of liberalism outside the western context.

This joint thinking-through of different liberalisms together requires a level of two-way social empathy seldom achieved in western-Muslim relations. It requires both cultures to interrogate the language of their respective power centers to understand how each systematically practices cultural exclusion of the other (van Dijk, 1993). It further requires a deepening across both liberalisms of how the rights of formal tolerance and respect balance against what Downing (1999: p. 182) calls the "right to be understood" from within one's own cultural position: What Downing said of the racist hate speaker can be said of insensitive communication crossing Muslim-west boundaries: "Whereas no one fails to understand the racist hate speaker, many do fail to understand – either through obtuseness, arrogance, socially ingrained instinct, plain lack of concern, and sometimes absence of information – the experiences of historically repressed minority ethnic groups." Similarly, few in the west who cherish liberal thinking failed to understand what Flemming Rose was

up to in publishing the cartoons. The west's failure was in understanding how Muslims would receive the cartoons and the violation *they* experienced.

The one important difference between historically repressed minorities in America and Muslims is that the former wanted greater purchase in the majority culture and its power centers. Muslims do not want to be fully integrated into the west. And, westerners, as Rose states accurately, want to respect Islam without submitting to it. So both parties are sure how they don't want to be understood by one another. But this leaves the much harder question of determining how in fact they do want to be understood in the eyes of other. Both liberalisms must protect that, so long as both can agree on the divide between respect and submission. Given the fragmentation of their history, how Muslims want to be understood in western eyes and how the west wants to be understood in theirs remains an open and ongoing project, both for Muslims and the west. Until that cross-cultural project of mutual empathy, leading to mutual understandings of guaranteed formal respect, is further along, stereotypes of Muslim anger and western fear will continue to duke it out in journalistic and other discourses as a clash of civilizations.

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News Source	Date	News Source	Date
International Herald Tribune	2006_02_01	BBC NEWS	2006_02_08
TV New Zealand	2006_02_04	TV New Zealand	2006_02_08
TV New Zealand	2006_02_04	Arab News.com	2006_02_09
Guardian (UK)	2006_02_04	The Age (Australia)	2006_02_09
NY Times	2006_02_04	San Diego Union Tribune	2006_02_09
WFMZ.com (Philadelphia TV news)	2006_02_06	Boston Ledger	2006_02_09
Taipei Times	2006_02_06	Christian Science Monitor	2006_02_09
Taipei Times	2006_02_06	English Aljazeera.net	2006_02_09
BBC NEWS	2006_02_07	The Age (Australia)	2006_02_09
Spiegel Online (Germany)	2006_02_07	NY Times	2006_10_09
San Francisco Chronicle	2006_02_07	Washington Post	2006_02_10
CNN.com	2006_02_07	The Hindu (India)	2006_02_11
International Herald Tribune	2006_02_07	China Post (Taiwan)	2006_02_11
Internal Herald Tribune	2006_02_07	NYTimes.com	2006_03_11
RTE News (Ireland)	2006_02_07	IslamOnline.net	2006_02_11
TV New Zealand	2006_02_07	Newsday	2006_02_11
The Age (Australia)	2006_02_07	English Aljazeera.net	2006_02_12
BBC NEWS	2006_02_07	English Aljazeera.net	2006_02_12
Times of India	2006_02_07	IslamOnline.net	2006_02_12
The Age (Australia)	2006_02_08	English Aljazeera.net	2006_02_13
Guardian (UK)	2006_02_08	English Aljazeera.net	2006_02_13
San Diego Union Tribune	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_02_17
Radio Free Europe (US)	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_02_18
Turkish Daily News	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_02_18
TV New Zealand	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_02_21
Taipei Times	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_02_24
TV New Zealand	2006_02_08	NY Times	2006_03_15
Reuters (in Arab News)	2006_02_08		

FIGURE 1: 56 News Stories on the Danish Cartoon Controversy Used in our Study. Ordered in ascending order from top to bottom by date of appearance. Retrieved from Google News Archive on November 2, 3, and 4 2006.



FIGURE 2: The distribution of 53 of the 56 news stories between February 1 and February 24. February 8 was the modal news day, with 12 stories retrieved for that day.

Anger Words (451 total in our coding): Samples are *angered, angering, annoys, antagonism avenger, brutalize, contemptuousness, coward, cruelly, damnably, deceitful, enraged, fed-up, fuming, grievance, grumps, grumpy, gut-less, huffy, idiocies, idiocy, idiot, idiotic, idiotically, idiots, infuriatingly, infuriation, irately, livid, pissed-off, rages, rancor, rancorous, reproaches, reproachful, seething, selfishly, shameful, shut-out, simple-minded, slaughter, treachery, umbrage, vengeance-seeking, vengefulness, vented, viciousness, vitriolic.*

Fear Words (253 total in our coding): Samples are: *afraid, anxieties, apprehension, creepiness, creepy, danger, fear, frightening, frighteningly, hair-raising, half-afraid, heartstopping, horrific, horror, horror-fraught, horror-stricken, horror-struck, impends, incur, long-threatened, mortal-fear, mortal-fears, nailbiter, nerve-jangling, nerve-racked, nightmarish, pain-fearing, panic, panic-driven, panic-pale, panic-prone, panicky, panicmongers, scaremongers, scares, tensions, terrified, terror-bearing, terror-breathing, terror-breeding, terror-bringing, terrors, threat, threaten, vulnerabilities, vulnerability, worried, worriedly, worse-case.*

FIGURE 3: Sample of Words used to code for anger and fear in 56 news articles. The complete coding library included 451 "anger" words and 253 "fear" words. See main text for further details.

Cluster 1 Stories
(High Anger to Fear Ratio)

News Source/Date		Anger Words (Frequency)	Fear Words (Frequency)
San Diego Union Tribune	2006_02_08	1.6	0
The Age(Australia)	2006_02_09	1.58	0
The Age(Australia)	2006_02_08	0.96	0
TV New Zealand	2006_02_04	0.88	0
Aljazeera.net	2006_02_13	0.84	0.21
BBC NEWS	2006_02_07	0.81	0
Spiegel Online (Germany)	2006_02_07	0.69	0.09
San Diego Union Tribune	2006_02_08	0.68	0
NY Times	2006_03_11	0.66	0.11
The Age(Australia)	2006_02_09	0.61	0
Guardian(UK)	2006_02_08	0.56	0
WFMZ Philly TV	2006_02_06	0.55	0
Aljazeera.net	2006_02_12	0.52	0
Boston Ledger	2006_02_09	0.43	0

FIGURE 4: Cluster 1 stories. Cluster 1 found News sources in which the expression of anger dominates in frequency the expression of fear. The San Diego Union Tribune (top) has the highest frequency of anger in this cluster, on average 1.6 words per 100 words. The Boston Ledger (bottom) has the least, .43 words per 100 on average. Notice the high frequency of anger relative to fear for each story in this cluster. This is a defining characteristic of cluster 1.

Cluster 2 Stories
(Higher Fear to Anger Ratio)

News Source/Date		Anger Words (Frequency)	Fear Words (Frequency)
TV New Zealand	2006_02_08	0	0.85
TV New Zealand	2006_02_08	0.29	0.57
Taipei Times	2006_02_08	0.25	0.51
Aljazeera.net	2006_02_09	0.49	0.48
TV New Zealand	2006_02_07	0.21	0.43
Taipei Times	2006_02_06	0.74	0.42
RTE News (Ireland)	2006_02_07	0.21	0.42
Aljazeera.net	2006_02_12	0	0.4
Radio Free Europe(US)	2006_02_08	0.49	0.39
TV New Zealand	2006_02_04	0.36	0.36
The Hindu (India)	2006_02_11	0.35	0.35

FIGURE 5: Cluster 2 stories. News sources where, relative to the other clusters, the ratio of fear to anger is highest . TV New Zealand (top) has the highest frequency of fear words (.85 per 100 words) in this cluster and The Hindu (bottom) the least (.35 per 100 words).

Cluster 3 Stories **(Relatively Low Anger/Low Fear)** **News Source/Date**	Anger Words (Frequency)	Fear Words (Frequency)
Turkish Daily News 2006_02_08	0.49	0.08
San Diego Union Tribune 2006_02_09	0.51	0.3
San Francisco Chronicle 2006_02_07	0.44	0.11
NY Times 2006_02_17	0.39	0.08
CNN.com 2006_02_07	0.48	0.12
Washington Post 2006_02_10	0.51	0.07
Christian Science Monitor 2006_02_09	0.45	0.22
Guardian(UK) 2006_02_04	0.32	0.22
International Herald Tribune 2006_02_07	0.36	0.12
China Post(Taiwan) 2006_02_11	0.27	0.14
NY Times.com 2006_02_24	0.33	0.25
Arab News 2006_02_09	0.44	0.06
NY Times 2006_02_18	0.21	0
International Herald Tribune 2006_02_07	0.22	0.07
Aljazeera.net 2006_02_13	0.3	0.1
The Age (Australia) 2006_02_07	0.19	0.29
IslamOnline.net 2006_02_11.txt	0.27	0
International Herald Tribune 2006_02_01	0.34	0.17
Taipei Times 2006_02_06	0.15	0.3
TV New Zealand 2006_02_08	0.15	0.3
NY Times 2006_02_04	0.26	0.2
NY Times 2006_02_21	0.12	0
Newsday 2006_02_11	0.11	0
Reuters (in Arab News) 2006_02_08	0.11	0
BBC NEWS 2006_02_07	0.2	0
NY Times 2006_10_09	0	0
NY Times 2006_03_15	0.09	0.18
NY Times 2006_02_18	0	0.23
BBC NEWS 2006_02_08	0	0.13
Times of India 2006_02_07	0	0
IslamOnline.net 2006_02_12	0	0

FIGURE 6: Cluster 3 stories. News sources where the frequency of fear and anger words are jointly low relative to Cluster 1 and 2 stories.

	Distribution of Anger in Cluster 1	
	Non-Muslim Expressing Anger	Muslim Expressing Anger
total	3	58

	Distribution of Anger in Cluster 2	
	Non-Muslim Expressing Anger	Muslim Expressing Anger
total	2	30

	Distribution of Anger in Cluster 3	
	Non-Muslim Expressing Anger	Muslim Expressing Anger
total	16	49

FIGURE 7: Distribution of anger in cluster 1, 2, and 3 stories. The numbers indicate total counts of occurrences of each emotion category. Notice that across all clusters, where news stories involve anger, the anger is significantly more often ascribed to Muslims than non-Muslims at the $p < .01$ level using the Chi-Square test (see text for further details).

Distribution of Fear in Cluster 1		
	Non-Muslim Expressing Fear	Muslim Expressing Fear
total	2	1

Distribution of Fear in Cluster 2		
	Non-Muslim Expressing Fear	Muslim Expressing Fear
total	10	1

Distribution of Fear in Cluster 3		
	Non-Muslim Expressing Fear	Muslim Expressing Fear
total	30	6

FIGURE 8: Distribution of fear in cluster 1, 2, and 3 stories. The numbers Indicate total counts of occurrences of each emotion category. Notice that in clusters 2 and 3, where stories involve fear in greater abundance, the fear is more often ascribed to non-Muslims than to Muslims. This is a strong descriptive trend that approaches but does not meet statistical significance at the .05 level.

[1] (http://news.google.com/archivesearch?q=danish+cartoon+controversy&sa=N&cid=4363686772737